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COPYRIGHT AND CONTROL OVER NEW TECHNOLOGIES
OF DISSEMINATION
Jane C. Ginsburg*
The relationship of copyright to new technologies that exploit copyrighted works is often perceived to pit copyright against progress. Historically, when copyright owners seek to eliminate a new kind of dissemination,
and when courts do not deem that dissemination harmful to copyright owners, courts decline to find infringement. However, when owners seek instead
to participate in and be paidfor the new modes of exploitation, the courts,
and Congress, appearmore favorable to copyright control over that new market. Today, the courts and Congress regard the unlicensed distribution of
works over the Internet as impairingcopyright owners' ability to avail themselves of new marketsfor digitalcommunication of works; they accord control
over those markets to copyright owners in order to promote wide dissemination. Copyright control by authors,particularlythose excluded by traditional
intermediary-controlled distribution systems, may offer the public an increased quantity and variety of works of authorship.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Constitution designed copyright to "promote the progress of science" by assuring authors "the exclusive right" to their writings.' Authors' ability to control and be compensated for their works makes it
worth their while to be creative. But the constitutional formulation does
not tell us how much control authors should be able to exercise over their
works. That turns on the scope of copyright protection, particularly with
respect to new markets fostered by new technologies. In articulating the
reach of the author's exclusive rights over reproduction, distribution, and
public performance and display, 2 the copyright statute and the judges
who interpret it attempt a balance: Creators should maintain sufficient
control over new markets to keep the copyright incentive meaningful, but
not so much as to stifle the spread of the new technologies of
3
dissemination.
* Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia Law
School. Many thanks for research assistance to Caroline Corbin, and to Tucker McCrady,
both Columbia Law School class of 2001, as well as to Carrie Casselman, Columbia Law
School class of 2003. 1 am also grateful to Columbia Law Review editor David Gold, class of
2002, for his many and gentle improvements to the manuscript. Professor Diane
Zimmerman and the participants in the NYU Law School Engelberg Center Workshop on
Innovation Policy offered helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3)-(6) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The author's exclusive
rights also cover derivative works. Id. § 106(2).
3. See, e.g., 144 Cong. Rec. Sll,887, SII,888 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of
Sen. Ashcroft) (explaining his belief that Digital Millennium Copyright Act would protect
copyright holders without limiting development of legitimate new technologies). For
more general discussions of copyright law as a balancing of interests, see, for example,
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The setting of the copyright balance is not immutable; rather, each
significant technological progress may alter the balance of control between authors and users, in turn eventually prompting a new legal calibration. For example, until the advent of the photocopier, copyright
owners substantially controlled the production and dissemination of copies of works of authorship, as the public could not obtain the work without purchasing a copy, or borrowing one from a library or a friend.
Before mass market audio and video recording equipment, copyright
owners also controlled access to works made publicly available through
performances and transmissions, because the public could not see or
hear the work without attending a licensed live performance, or viewing
or listening to it through licensed media. With the arrival of these technologies, the de facto, and often the dejure, balance substantially shifted
to users. With the Internet and Congress's recent response to it, the balance may be shifting yet again. This potential shift has occasioned much
outcry from those who fear the pendulum has swung too far to the copy4
right-owning side.
Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright, 77-88 (2001) (tracing evolution of the "metaphor"
behind copyright law from that of a "bargain between authors and the public" to that of
"the right of a property owner to protect what is rightfully hers"); Simon Fitzpatrick,
Copyright Imbalance: U.S. and Australian Responses to the WIPO Digital Copyright
Treaty, 22 Eur. intell. Prop. Rev. 214, 216 (2000) (considering balance between interests of
copyright owners and copyright users); William Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18(2)J. Legal Stud. 325, 326 (1989) (explaining that "[s]triking
the correct balance between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright
law"); Thomas Vinje, Copyright Imperilled?, 21 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 192, 194 (1999)
(emphasizing need for devising new exceptions and limitations to preserve the "copyright
balance"); Pamela Samuelson, Does Information Really Have to be Licensed?, Comm. of
the ACM, Sept. 1998, at 15, 15 (explaining that copyright law "has a longstanding tradition
of balancing the interests of copyright owners and those of the consuming public").
4. See, e.g., Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 3, at 81-86 (describing
overexpansion of copyright through examples of the repeal of first sale doctrine,
contraction of privilege of fair use, and expansion of notion of "piracy" with advent of
Internet technology); Julie E. Cohen, WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the
United States: Will Fair Use Survive?, 21 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev., 236, 237-38 (1999)
(explaining that DMCA will likely improperly narrow the fair use doctrine); Robert C.
Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 Yale LJ. 1661, 1683-86 (1999) [hereinafter Denicola,
Freedom to Copy] (expressing concern with recent expansion of private rights in
copyright law); Robert C. Denicola, Mostly Dead? Copyright Law in the New Millennium,
47 J. Copyright Soc'y USA 193, 204-07 (2000) [hereinafter Denicola, Mostly Dead?]
(arguing that balance between incentive for copyright holders and public access has
shifted towards "a free market in property rights rooted in the natural entitlement of
creators"); L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. Copyright Soc'y
USA 365, 387-89 (2000) (arguing that Congress inappropriately granted a "natural law
monopoly" in DMCA "comprised of rights for the creator to the exclusion of any duties");
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the AntiCircumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 519, 566 (1999)
[hereinafter Samuelson, Digital Economy] (arguing that certain provisions of DMCA are
overbroad and warning of its "potential for substantial unintended detrimental
consequences"); Yochai Benkler, The Battle Over the Institutional Ecosystem in the Digital
Environment, Comm. of the ACM, Feb. 2001, at 84, 86 (explaining that "the expansion of
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The confluence of new technologies of access control and copy control, and new legislation in the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) preventing their circumvention, 5 may in fact have enhanced the
ability of copyright owners to wield electronic protective measures to control new kinds of exploitation of their works. In reaction, critics assert
that the goal of copyright law has never been, and should not now become, to grant "control" over works of authorship, but rather to accord
certain limited rights over some kinds of exploitations. 6 Economic incentives to create may be needed to achieve the constitutional goal of public
instruction, but those incentives should be as modest as possible. Copyright, much recent scholarship has urged, has not and should not cover
7
every way of making money from, or of enjoying, a work of authorship.
Thus, according to this view, when new technologies spawn new markets
for copyrighted works, we should not simply assume that copyright own-

exclusive private rights in information tilts the

institutional ecosystem within which

information is produced against peer production and in favor of industrial production");
Pamela Samuelson, Good News and Bad News on the Intellectual Property Front, Comm.
of the ACM, Mar. 1999, at 19, 24 [hereinafter Samuelson, Good News and Bad News]
("Experience ...demonstrates that the threat of overreaction is more than hypothetical.").
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V 1999), added as part of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act.
6. See, e.g., Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 3, at 81-86 ("Copyright owners,
however, have never been entitled to control all uses of their works. Instead, Congress has
accorded Copyright owners some exclusive rights, and has reserved other rights to the
general public."); Patterson, supra note 4, at 365-66 (tracing Anglo American history of
copyright law and explaining that its purpose is to protect copyright holders, not to allow
them to deny public access to copyrighted materials).
7. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 4, at 239-40 (discussing importance of fair use
doctrine and threats that DMCA presents to it); Denicola, Freedom to Copy, supra note 4,
at 1676-77 (explaining importance of maintaining a rich public domain and discussing
social costs of recognizing exclusive rights to works); Denicola, Mostly Dead?, supra note 4,
at 195 ("Limitations on the rights of copyright owners are embedded throughout the
copyright statute."); Patterson, supra note 4, at 393-94 (explaining how copyright allocates
certain rights with regard to a work to the writer and others to the public); Samuelson,
Digital Economy, supra note 4, at 534 (criticizing DMCA for catering more to interests of
copyright industries than to those of information technology sector and public); Benkler,
supra note 4, at 87 (criticizing overly extensive intellectual property rights as inefficient
and opposed to purpose of copyright law); Samuelson, Good News and Bad News, supra
note 4, at 24 (warning that imbalanced countermeasures to digital threats hurt public as
well as industries in emerging markets); Litman, The Demonization of Piracy 2 (April 6,
2000), at http://www.law.wayne.edu/litman/papers/demon.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (arguing that "copyright is now a tool for copyright owners to use to extract all
the potential commercial value from works of authorship, even if that means that uses that
have long been deemed legal are now brought within the copyright owner's control"); see
also Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Property Rights in Information:
Justification and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information, and
the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System, 9 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media &
Ent. L.J. 301, 316-23 (1998) (discussing alternative incentives to generate information in
absence of explicit property rights); Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 331 (discussing
benefits copyright holders enjoy beyond those conveyed by the copyright itself).
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ers ought to control those new markets by restricting the use of those
technologies.
There is doctrinal support for the contention that copyright never
assured authors even a limited monopoly over all forms of exploitation.
For example, the "first sale doctrine" removes the resale and rental markets from copyright owners' control. 8 The fair use exception permits a
variety of unauthorized reproductions or derivative works, sometimes
even for commercial purposes. 9 And new technology cases of the past,
from piano rolls to cable television to videotape recorders, have variously
limited the scope of copyright, either by finding that the exploitation did
not come within the copyright holder's statutory rights, or, despite prima
facie infringement, by finding fair use. 10 Indeed, a review of past confrontations between copyright and new technological means of dissemination suggests that courts often are reluctant to restrain the public availability of new technologies, even when those technologies appear
principally designed to exploit copyrighted works."I
That said, when courts have curtailed the scope of copyright protection, Congress often has stepped in to assure copyright owners some form
of compensation from the new means of exploitation-if not always control over it. 1 2 Because these compromise measures generally have taken
the form of compulsory licenses that trade control for compensation, '
one might therefore conclude that when copyright and new technology
conflict the copyright owner's right to control the disposition of the work
must yield to a greater public interest in promoting its unfettered (if not
always unpaid) dissemination.
In fact, the judicial and legislative resolution of tensions between the
exercise of control under copyright on the one hand and the availability
of new technology on the other is far more nuanced, and notwithstanding current critiques, supports a continued role for control in a new tech8. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994). But see id. § 109(b) (defining rental right of
copyright owners of sound recordings and computer programs).
9. Id. § 107; see, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575-94 (1994)
(applying fair use exception to commercial sound recording of song parody).
10. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456
(1984) (videotape recorders); Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394, 411-14 (1974)
(cable transmissions); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390,
399-402 (1968) (same); White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1908) (pianola rolls).
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (cable); id. § 115 (mechanical
license); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k) (Supp. V 1999) (mandating copy control devices for
analog videotape recorders and prohibiting their circumvention). An additional rationale
for compulsory license schemes is reduction of the transaction costs that negotiated
licenses would impose. Robert Cassler, Copyright Compulsory Licenses-Are They
Coming or Going?, 37J. Copyright Soc'y USA 231, 249 (1990) (explaining that compulsory
licenses are useful in reducing transaction costs in situations where such costs are
"recognized as substantial and logistically difficult").
13. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115, 118, 119 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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nological environment. Although the DMCA's regulation of technological measures may endeavor to ensure greater control for copyright
owners over new markets created by new technology than in the past, the
logic underlying this legislation is consistent with earlier approaches to
copyright/technology conflicts.
In Part II, this Article suggests that pre-DMCAjudicial and legislative
responses to controversies involving copyright and new technologies reveal a pattern that will help us understand when and why a court or Congress will (or will not) privilege dissemination over control. The Article
argues that when copyright owners seek to eliminate a new kind of dissemination, and when courts do not deem that dissemination harmful to copyright owners, courts decline to find infringement, even though the legal
and economic analyses that support those determinations often seem
strained, not to say disingenuous. This does not always mean, however,
that courts refuse protection, or that Congress imposes a compulsory license, each time copyright encounters new technology. Rather, when
copyright owners seek to participatein and be paid for the new modes of
exploitation, the courts, and Congress, appear more favorable, not only
to the proposition that copyright owners should get somethingfor the new
exploitation, but more importantly, to the proposition that when the new
market not merely supplements but also rivals prior markets, copyright
owners should control that new market. The control permits copyright
4
owners to refuse to license, and therefore to charge market prices.'
Part III then considers whether, given the special characteristics of
the Internet environment that serves as the backdrop to the DMCA, the
pattern discerned in the earlier copyright/technology confrontations still
holds. I observe that the Ninth Circuit's recent Napster decision' 15 and
other developing case law addressing alleged infringements on the Internet and construing the Copyright Act without the DMCA amendments
hold that online exploitations create a new market whose control the
copyright law awards to authors and their successors in title.' 6 Significantly, these decisions focus more on the role of control in developing
potential new markets than on the harm a lack of control would bring to
old ones. I posit that these decisions' supportive approach toward copyright owners' control derives from courts' perception that the unlicensed
(and often unpaid) distribution of works over the Internet competes unfairly not only with traditional forms of hardcopy distribution, but more
importantly, with the copyright owner's ability to avail itself of new mar14. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (Supp. V 1999) (granting digital sound performance
right in sound recordings); id. § 114(d)(2) (providing for compulsory license for
webcasting and exclusive rights for interactive media); see also infra Part II.B.
15. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
16. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352-53
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that fair use did not justify My.MP3.com's creation of a computer
database consisting of unauthorized copies of compact discs); L.A. Times v. Free Republic,
54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that online posting of reprinted
articles to facilitate commentary from online community is not transformative fair use).
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kets for downloading and audiostreaming.1 7 The case law thus adheres
to the pattern, but with a shift in emphasis toward control over technologically induced new markets regardless of the new markets' potential to
displace the old.
On the legislative side, I contend that Congress's recent provision for
protection of technological measures controlling access to and copying
from copyrighted works, particularly those made available through digital
media and networks, implements lessons drawn from prior resolutions of
tensions between copyright and new technologies, and is consistent with
the earlier pattern. A goal of the DMCA was to encourage copyright owners to make their works available through digital networks.' 8 Copyright
owners' fears that Internet dissemination would render their works instantly vulnerable to massive copying and redistribution underlay their
professed trepidation about exploiting this medium. While copyright
owners could distribute their works encased in some form of technological protection, they still perceived a probability that others would remove
those protections, making the work as vulnerable to unlicensed copying
as it would have been without resort to technological measures. 1 9 This
concern persuaded Congress that it could foster participation in digital
communication only by reinforcing copyright owners' control over the
distribution of their works. Congress thus concluded that the benefit of
participation outweighed the potential loss to the public of circumvention devices that enable more widespread communication of copyrighted
2z
works.
Finally, the Article considers whether and why it matters that, under
the view of the copyright law espoused here, copyright owners properly
retain control over new means of dissemination. The "whether" addresses the problem of futility; the "why" concerns authors. With respect
17. For discussion of these decisions, seeJane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse
on the Internet, 24 Colum.-VLAJ.L. & Arts 1, 22-42 (2000); infra Part IlI.B.
18. S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998) ("Due to the ease with which digital works can be
copied . . . copyright owners will hesitate to make their works readily available on the
Internet without reasonable assurance that they will be protected against massive piracy.");
see also David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 673, 680 (2000) ("The millennial hope underlying the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act is to bring U.S. copyright law 'squarely into the digital age."' (footnote
omitted)).
19. For an earlier example of this cat and mouse problem, see, for example, Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 256-58 (5th Cir. 1988) (assessing program to
remove anticopy protection from consumer software).
20. 1 have elsewhere addressed whether the particular means that Congress chose to
reinforce copyright owners' control may go too far. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright
Legislation for the "Digital Millennium," 23 Colum.-VLAJ.L. & Arts 137, 144-55 (1999)
[hereinafter Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation]; Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to
Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, in U.S.
Intellectual Property: Law and Policy (Hugh Hansen ed., forthcoming 2001) [hereinafter
Ginsburg, From Having Copies], available at Social Science Research Network, http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractjid=222493
(on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
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to the former, however convincing the demonstration that copyright
should vest control over new markets spawned by new technologies, will
copyright owners in fact be able to enforce that control? I consider several ways in which right holders might impose copyright compliance despite the availability of copyright-liberated copies. With respect to the latter, assuming that copyright owners can exercise effective control, is this
power misplaced if it primarily benefits industrial strength copyright owners, as opposed to authors themselves? The current debate over copyright control focuses on perceived or potential overreaching by powerful
intermediaries; the prospects for authors most often are overlooked. In
fact, I suggest that digital media, by making the means of production and
dissemination available to any computer-equipped author, give authors a
realistic opportunity to bring their works to the public without having to
put themselves in thrall to traditional intermediaries. The technological
measures that reinforce legal control may enable and encourage authorial entrepreneurship, because authors may be able to rely on these measures to secure the distribution of and payment for their works. Greater
author control not only enhances the moral appeal of the exercise of
copyright, but also may offer the public an increased quantity and variety
of works of authorship, as authors whom the traditional intermediarycontrolled distribution system may have excluded now may directly propose to the public (and be compensated for) their creations.
II.

COPYRIGHT CONFRONTS NEW TECHNOLOGIES OF COPYING
AND DISSEMINATION

A. In the Courts
The new technology cases, from piano rolls to Rio portable MP3
players, might at first blush appear to support the proposition that every
time a copyright owner tries to control a new technology, technology
wins. In fact, the cases fall into two distinct categories. The first covers
new technological modes of dissemination of works, when copyright owners seek not to obliterate the technology, but to be paid for the new
means of exploitation, for example, radio broadcast of musical compositions. In these cases, the new means of exploitation often is also perceived as competing with the old. Here, copyright owners have generally
prevailed.2 1 The second category comprehends new technological
modes of dissemination of works, when copyright owners are perceived to
be trying to prevent these new means from becoming available to the
public. This is the class of cases in which copyright owners have consistently fared ill.22 Even with respect to the second category, however, copy21. See infra Part II.A.1.
22. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456
(1984) (refusing to enjoin sale of video tape recorders as violation of Copyright Act);
Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394, 411-14 (1974) (determining that CATV
transmissions are not performances within meaning of Copyright Act); Fortnightly Corp. v.
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right owners have not always remained without remedy. Congress has
often imposed a compromise, allowing continued exploitation of the
technology, but with remuneration to the copyright owners-in other
words, substituting compensation for control. This Section of the Article
will consider the cases; the next Section will address the legislative
response.
1. When Copyright Owners Seek to Exploit the New Technology. - One of
the first new modes of dissemination that copyright owners sought to participate in, rather than to prevent, was radio broadcasting. The relatively
newly formed collective licensing society, ASCAP, offered performance
rights licenses to radio stations; the latter declined them, on the statutory
ground that their broadcasts either were not public performances "for
profit," as they did not charge to hear the music, 2 3 or that the performances were not "public," as they were received in private homes.2 4 The
broadcasters also advanced the economic ground that songwriters were
not harmed, as the broadcasts promoted sales of sheet music and sound
recordings of the songs. 2 5 All of these defenses failed. Courts had already evolved an expansive doctrine of "public performance forprofit" for
live performances in establishments open to the public, even when no
admission was charged. 26 The transmission to individual homes required
a greater doctrinal leap, as the 1909 copyright statute did not elaborate
on the meaning of public performance. 27 Courts adopted the common
sense view that these transmissions communicated the performance to
the public, even though the members of the public might be separated in
space. Economic concerns may have underlay this reasoning: If the public can hear the band's or orchestra's performance at home for free, why
incur the expense and inconvenience of going to the performance in the
concert hall (or of purchasing the sheet music in order to perform it
United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 399-402 (1968) (same); White-Smith Music
Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1908) (refusing to restrain production of
pianola rolls designed to play copyrighted songs); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v.
Diamond Multimredia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1076-81 (9th Cir. 1999) (denying request
to enjoin production of Rio portable music player and holding that it does not fall under
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992).
23. E.g., Pastime Amusement Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 2 F.2d 1020, 1020 (4th Cir.
1924) (rejecting defense that performance was not for profit in copyright infringement
suit); Assoc. Music Publishers, Inc. v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 829,
830-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (holding that radio broadcast is "for profit" within meaning of
Copyright Act); M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 779-80 (D.N.J.
1923) (same).
24. E.g.,Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411, 412 (6th
Cir. 1925) (holding that radio broadcast is "public performance" under Copyright Act).
25. M. Whilmark & Sons, 291 F. at 779-80.
26. E.g., Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 594-95 (1917) (determining that
performance of copyrighted material in restaurant is public performance for profit under
Copyright Act).
27. Cf. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining performing"publicly"
to include by transmission).
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oneself)? Radio was competing with licensed live performances, as well as
opening up a new market for at-home enjoyment of those performances. 28 Courts may also have been concerned that if broadcast music
displaced the previously dominant exploitations of musical works-live
performances and sale of sheet music-but only the broadcasters realized
the value of the new exploitation, the incentive for continued production
of musical compositions would diminish.
Retransmissions of radio broadcasts of music over closed-circuit systems in hotels proved another source of licensing disputes, with hotel
operators contending that the transmissions were not to the public if they
were received in private guest rooms. Again, the issue was not whether
the hotel operators could avail themselves of the technology; rather, it
was whether they were obliged to pay the authors for the exploitation by
means of the new technology. In this case, the initial transmission from
the radio station to the hotel was not at issue. The radio station's transmission would have been covered by its own performance right license.
Rather, the copyright owners claimed that the hotels themselves made
another transmission, in routing the broadcasts through the hotel's wiring to individual guest rooms.
The hotel's "secondary" transmission could have been seen as the
equivalent of putting a radio in every guest room; when individual guests
turn on the radio, there is no "public" performance by the hotel. Therefore, arguably, there should not be a performance by the hotel when the
hotel in effect turns on the radio for the guest by piping the music in.
But one might also look at the hotel's secondary transmission as substituting for a licensed primary transmission by the hotel, for example of live
or prerecorded music whose transmission originates from the hotel to the
guest rooms. Were the secondary transmission not also a public performance, hotels could avoid taking licenses by switching from live or prerecorded music to radio transmissions. In upholding the copyright owners' claims, Justice Brandeis remarked, "While this [form of exploitation]
may not have been possible before the development of radio broadcasting, the novelty of the means used does not lessen the duty of the courts
performance for profit
to give full protection to the monopoly of public
29
which Congress has secured to the composer."
28. The first radio cases concerned broadcasts of music performed in studios, rather
than prerecorded music. E.g., Jerome H. Remick & Co., 5 F.2d at 412 (stating that artist
performing for radio "is consciously addressing a great, though unseen and widely
scattered, audience"); M. Witmark & Sons, 291 F. at 776-77 ("[Defendant] has also
established and conducts a licensed radio broadcasting station ... from which vocal and
instrumental concerts ... are broadcasted.").
29. Buck v. Jewell LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) (holding that playing
copyrighted musical compositions broadcast from radio station via hotel loudspeakers is
infringing performance). For a more recent version of the problem, with a similar
outcome, see On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787,
790 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that closed circuit video transmissions to hotel guest rooms
are public performances).
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2. Mhen Copyright Owners Seek to Block the New Technology. - The Supreme Court has been more reluctant to "give full protection to the [copyright] monopoly" when it has perceived that groups of copyright owners
in particular sectors were seeking to prohibit a new form of reproduction
and distribution, or to leverage their exclusive reproduction rights into
monopoly power over the devices employed to effect the new kinds of
reproductions. An early case in this vein, White-Smith Music PublishingCo.
v. Apollo Co., decided in 1908, concerned pianola rolls. 3 ' The musical
composition was reproduced onto the pianola roll through perforations
that, when run through a player piano, would perform the musical composition. The Supreme Court nonetheless held that the unauthorized
pianola rolls were not infringing "copies" because, unlike sheet music,
the musical composition was not directly perceptible from the perforations. ' The majority so held despite Justice Holmes's objection that
"[o] n principle anything that mechanically reproduces that collocation of
'32
sounds ought to be held a copy."
The Court's requirement of visual perceptibility may not be fully persuasive doctrinally. It is true that the Court, in an earlier new technology
case concerning the protectability of photographs, had held that copyright comprehends all the ways "by which the ideas in the mind of the
author are given visible expression. '33 But the Court employed that
formula in a case involving visual media. Moreover, from the context of
the Court's earlier discussion, it is clear that the formula was intended to
be expansive, not restrictive. It is more likely that the White-Smith Court
anticipated that copyright owner claims regarding unauthorized pianola
rolls were an initial sally in the larger battle over music copyright owners'
exclusive reproduction rights-a battle whose outcome would determine
control over the emerging new technology of phonograms. 3 4 The Court
may have suspected that the music publishers were endeavoring either to
prevent the distribution of a new format that competed with sheet music,
or, equally perniciously, to control the market for phonogram recording
equipment and phonograph players. Indeed, it appears that music publishers initiated the case as part of a plan between music publishers and a
manufacturer of phonogram recording equipment to establish that the
copyright extended to mechanical reproduction, and then to transfer
30. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
31. Id. at 18.
32. Id. at 20 (Holmes, J., concurring).
33. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (emphasis
added).
34. Moreover, at the time of the decision, player pianos enjoyed considerable
popularity. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 9 ("The record discloses that in the year 1902 from
seventy to seventy-five thousand [player pianos] were in use in the United States, and that
from one million to one million and a half [piano rolls] were made in this country in that
year."). For an in-depth treatment of the development of phonograph technology during
this period, see generally Walter L. Welch & Leah Brodbeck Stenzel Burt, From Tinfoil to
Stereo: The AcotIstic Years of the Recording Industry 1877-1929 (1994).
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mechanical recording rights to a single establishment. In return, the single authorized manufacturer would pay the music copyright owners a
commission on every phonograph machine sold. 35 Because the logic of
Justice Holmes's concurrence clearly applied to other forms of mechanical recording as well as to piano rolls, a victory in the piano roll case
would bode ill for the nascent recording industry, as the copyright owners' plan would have ensured that only one entrant would be permitted.
Solicitude for a nascent dissemination industry also underlay the
Court's determinations in two controversies that cable retransmissions of
broadcast television did not involve a "performance" of the works and
thus fell outside the copyright monopoly. 36 In one case, the cable retransmission enhanced local signals; in the other, it imported distant signals. The Court determined that the retransmissions did not "perform"
the works contained in the signals because performance implied active
conduct, while the retransmission was more passive. In Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc., the Court distinguished cable retransmission
from a performance on the ground that cable was more akin to mere
"viewing" than "performing."3 7 The analogy held even when, in a second
case, Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, the "viewer" reached out to bring in programming not otherwise available in that area.3 8 The Court's analysis is
rather strained3 9 and can best be understood in the context of its perception that the broadcast industry was endeavoring to kill off a new rival,
cable. 40 In addition, the Teleprompter majority contended that television
broadcasters and copyright owners would not be harmed by distant signal
retransmissions, because they could adjust their advertising rates to account for the broader audience. 41 Thus, copyright owners appeared to
be behaving like unseemly monopolists, while, in the Court's perception,
35. See H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 6-8 (1909).
These contracts [between music publishers and a mechanical reproduction
company] were made in anticipation of a decision by the courts that the existing
law was broad enough to cover the mechanical reproduction, and one
consideration on the part of the reproducing company was an agreement that
that company would cause suit to be brought which would secure a decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States.
Id. at 8. On the tactics of the music industry, see generally Paul Goldstein, Copyright's
Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox 64-77 (1994).
36. Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394, 408-10 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1968).
37. 392 U.S. at 399-401.
38. 415 U.S. at 408.
39. Or "simplistic." Id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40. See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 403 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
[I]t is darkly predicted that the imposition of full liability upon all CATV
operations could result in the demise of this new, important instrument of mass
communications; or in its becoming a tool of the powerful networks which hold a
substantial number of copyrights on materials used in the television industry.
Id.
41. 415 U.S. at 411-13.
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the new technology would not harm, but might in fact expand, their
traditional markets.
Given those considerations (and in hindsight), the Court's decision
in the "Betamax" controversy4 2 might seem like "dejd vu all over again. 43
There, motion picture producers sued the manufacturers and distributors of mass market videotape recorders, on the ground that the recorders facilitated massive uncompensated and infringing private copying.
On a traditional copyright analysis, the dissent is considerably more carefully reasoned than the majority opinion, 44 which treats the statutory fair
use factors rather cavalierly and strains the doctrine of contributory infringement to exculpate devices that are "merely ...capable of substantial noninfringing uses," perhaps even regardless of the actual infringing
use to which they are put.45 The majority's extraordinarily forgiving approach is best understood in light of the features the controversy shared
with the cable cases. First, the motion picture industry was attempting to
prevent the distribution of videotape recorders, in favor of a different
technology, nonrecordable videodisc players. 46 Second, the majority
found no economic harm to existing markets from "time-shifting" of free
broadcast television programming (having excluded other kinds of copying or programming from its analysis). 47 The dissent charged the majority with focusing on the wrong market; the court should have inquired
into the impact of the videotape recorder on new markets for television
programming, not merely on extant television markets. 48 This objection
recalls the cable cases as well, where the dissenters observed, particularly
in Teleprompter, that the technology had opened up a new market that
normally would come within copyright owners' control, 49 and the majority responded that copyright owners could nonetheless extract revenues
from the new markets. 50 While the Betamax majority did not project what
benefits the new technology would bring copyright owners, the ensuing
boon to studios from development of the video rental market is well
42. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
43. Yogi Berra, Yogi-isms, at http://www.yogi-berra.com/yogiisins.html (last visited
Aug. 20, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
44. This may well be because Justice Blackmun's dissent was to have been the majority
opinion, until Justice Stevens rallied sufficient colleagues to his dissent to shift the
outcome. See Goldstein, supra note 35, at 149-57.
45. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. The "merely capable" standard may be dictum, as the
decision indicated that the predominant use for the videotape recorder at the time was for
"time-shifting" free broadcast television. Id. at 421. This is the noninfringing use the
Belamax majority found. Id. at 456.
46. For a full and fascinating account of the business as well as the legal aspects of the
Betamax case, see generally James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and
the Onslaught of the VCR (1987).
47. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
48. Id. at 484 n.36, 497.
49. See Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394, 417-19 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
50. See id. at 412-13.
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known (and frequently asserted against subsequent copyright owner ob51
jections to new technologies of copying).
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's decision in a controversy between the recording industry and the manufacturers of the Rio portable MP3 player
also demonstrates that courts will interpret the statutory grant of rights
narrowly if they perceive that copyright owners are trying to stop technology.52 In that case, the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) sought to enjoin distribution of the Rio on the ground that the
Rio violated the terms of the 1992 Audio Home Recording Act, 53 because
the Rio was a "digital audio recording device" that did not incorporate
54
the Serial Copy Management System (SCMS) mandated by the statute.
In considering a temporary injunction, the district court held that the Rio
was likely to be a device covered by the statute and noted the possibility
that the producers therefore might be obliged to pay a statutory royalty
for each machine sold, but that the SCMS requirement was irrelevant, as
the Rio was not capable of making serial recordings in any event. 55 Both
sides appealed. The Ninth Circuit held that the Rio was not a "digital
5 6
and, therefore, was exempt both from the
audio recording device,"1
51. For example, Napster defenders regularly point to the economic benefits the
movie industry reaped from the videocassette technology at issue in Sony. See, e.g., Reply
Brief of Appellant Napster, Inc. at 20, Napster, Inc. v. A&M Records, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2000) (Nos. 00-16401 and 00-16403), available at http://www.Napster.com/
pressroom/legal.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Sam Costello, How VCRs
May Help Napster's Legal Fight, The Industry Standard, available at http://
www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1902,17095,00.html (July 25, 2000) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (noting that "'[tlhe similarity in the court of public opinion that
Napster is going for is that the film industry hated the VCR, hated Betamax, they wanted to
wipe it out, but it turned out to make them a lot of money"' (quoting Eric Scheirer, Analyst
at Forrester Research)); Richard B. Simon, Music Fans Buying What They Hear Online,
47
2 (June 16,
Study Says, at http://www.sonicnet.com/news/archive/story.jhtml?id=1021
2000) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
In addition, the vast popularity of the videotape recorder may have made it difficult
for the Court to rule that millions of Americans were daily committing copyright
infringement in their homes. Cf. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 9
(1908) (observing that many thousands of player pianos and millions of piano rolls had
been sold to American public).
52. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072,
1076-81 (9th Cir. 1999).
53. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1010 (1994)). The genesis of this statute is discussed infra Part II.B.
54. 180 F.3d at 1075. Serial copying is "the duplication in a digital format of a
copyrighted musical work or sound recording from a digital reproduction of a digital
musical recording." 17 U.S.C. § 1001(11). SCMS allows the recorder to make "first
generation" copies from the original source but not to make further copies from the first
generation copy. SCMS "sends, receives, and acts upon information about the generation
and copyright status of the files that it plays." 180 F.3d at 1075.
55. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d
624, 632 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
56. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d at 1081.
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SCMS requirement and from any obligation to pay royalties, as the statute
regulated only digital audio recording devices.
The question whether the Rio was a device covered by the statute was
a difficult one. The device did not itself record MP3 files directly from
the Internet; a general purpose computer performed that task, then
transferred those files either to the Rio's internal memory or to a memory
card that could be played in the Rio. Even though the Rio did not initiate the recording of MP3 files, one might nonetheless determine, as did
the district court, that the transfer from a computer hard drive to the
Rio's memory required the Rio to make its own reproduction of those
files. As a result, the Rio could be deemed a "digital audio recording
device." If the Ninth Circuit rejected that reasoning, it may at least in
part have been influenced by the RIAA's apparent desire to block distribution of the Rio altogether, rather than simply to receive a royalty from
its sale.
B. In Congress: Muting Controlfor Compensation
In many of the new technology cases, courts faced with what appeared to be all-or-nothing attempts at copyright enforcement preferred
to interpret the statute in a way that would leave the copyright owners
with nothing.5 7 Congress, however, has often readjusted the balance by
imposing a compulsory license scheme that permitted continued distribution of the new technology, while assuring payment to copyright owners.
While the early forms of statutory intervention generally removed copyright owners from control over the licensed exploitation, more recent
versions combine compensation with control, or even restore a degree of
control, for example by specifying how copyright owners may employ
technology to protect their works from copying.
1. Compensation In Lieu of Control. - The 1909 Act established the
first compulsory license regime. After White-Smith, record producers
sought to preserve the free rein the Supreme Court had left them, while
copyright holders endeavored to repair the loss of exclusive rights
wrought by their ill-fated litigation strategy. The Senate, less moved than
the Court by the claims of new technology, was initially disposed to re57. This reaction to perceived copyright owner overreaching is not limited to new
technology cases. It underlies the articulation of the "idea/expression merger" doctrine,
which precludes protection for expression that cannot be separated from the idea, system,
or process it expounds. Thus, for example, a copyright owner who endeavored to exercise
a monopoly in his system of bookkeeping on the ground that defendant copied from his
copyrighted book the charts necessary to implement the system found himself with no
copyright at all. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879).
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, by contrast, the Ninth Circuit held
that the videotape recorder violated the motion picture producers' reproduction rights,
but attempted to craft a judge-made compulsory license that would permit continued
distribution of the devices, subject to a royalty paid to the copyright owners. 659 F.2d 963,
976 & n.18 (9th Cir. 1981).
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store full exclusive rights. 58 The House, howeve'r, sought to reconcile the
right of the composer to prohibit mechanical reproduction with a public
policy to prevent "the establishment of a mechanical-music trust." 59 The
House feared that music copyright owners "by controlling these copyrights [would] monopolize the business of manufacturing [and] selling
music-producing machines, otherwise free to the world. ' 60 Copyright on
61
the music should not result in an additional patent on the machinery.
Congress ultimately diverged from the White-Smith holding by extending
the reproduction right to mechanical reproductions but then substantially limited the exclusivity of the right. The legislative compromise gave
the composer the exclusive right to determine if any recording would be
made at all, but once the first recording was authorized, any other record
producer was entitled, upon obtaining the statutory license and paying
62
the statutory fee, to make its own recording of the musical composition.
This measure thus compensated copyright holders but permitted the development of a recording industry by ensuring competition among record producers and the manufacturers of the phonograph equipment.
The cable retransmission compulsory license introduced in the 1976
Copyright Act followed a similar pattern. After the Supreme Court had
held that the retransmissions were not "performances,' 63 Congress defined "perform" in extremely broad terms, 64 clearly sufficient to cover the
conduct at issue in Fortnightly and Teleprompter. Congress then instituted a
complicated compulsory license scheme designed to permit retransmission of local and distant signals, but subject to payment of the statutory
license fee, as well as to a requirement that the cable operator not change
65
the content of the retransmitted signal in any way.
58. See S. Rep. No. 59-6187, pt. 2, at 3 (1907), reprinted in 6 Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act, pt. Q (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976).
Some protest has been heard from the manufacturers of mechanical musical
instruments against any legislation which would control their unrestricted right to
use the property of others for their private gain, but this protest has been so
manifestly selfish that it has only served to impress upon the committee more
strongly the injustice of the existing state of the law.
Id. See also White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1908)
(discussing earlier cases). Although the Senate Report preceded the Supreme Court's
decision, the Senate committee was reacting to lower court decisions in the same case,
which had also held for the defendant. See S. Rep. No. 59-6187, at 3.
59. H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909), reprinted in 6 Legislative History of the 1909
Copyright Act, supra note 58, at S-1.
60. Id.
61. Edison had applied for a patent for his phonograph recorder in 1908. U.S. Patent
No. 1,020,485 (issued Mar. 19, 1912).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1925) (repealed 1978).
63. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1968);
see supra text accompanying note 37.
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
65. Id. § 111; see also WGN Cont'l Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 625
(7th Cir. 1982) (holding that "deletion of the teletext from United Video's retransmission
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2. Some Compensation, Some Control. - More recently, Congress has
introduced more complicated ways of splitting the difference between
the control that exclusive rights implies and the fostering of new technologies of dissemination. The 1992 Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA)
was a post-Betamax measure designed to respond to the perceived threat
to the music industry (record producers and musical composition right
holders) from digital audio recording media. Copyright owners sought
to distinguish Betamax and thereby avert the decision's generalization
into a principle that would insulate all kinds of home recording. They
therefore contended that, unlike the Betamax's impact on the market for
broadcast audiovisual works, digital audio recorders would harm sales of
authorized phonorecords, because digital recorders, unlike analog devices, could make perfect multigenerational copies of the recorded music. 6 6 Having learned a lesson from Betamax, copyright owners cooperated with hardware manufacturers in proposing to Congress that the
distribution of digital audio recording devices be permitted, subject to a
statutory royalty on the equipment and blank recording media, so long as
the devices allowed therecording only of a first generation copy. In
other words, copyright owners conceded a de facto license to make private digital copies from the original recorded source, in return for a roy67
alty that would help compensate for the copying.
On the other hand, copyright owners secured control over second
generation copying, because the statute curtailed copyright owners' exclusive rights only for the first generation, and more importantly, because
the statute mandated the inclusion of the Serial Copy Management System in every covered digital audio recording device. 68 SCMS recognizes
when a copy has been made and prevents further copying from that copy.
In addition, the AHRA made it unlawful to offer services or to distribute
devices primarily designed to circumvent SCMS. 69 For the first time,
Congress reinforced exclusive legal rights by providing for technological
measures to protect those rights, and then by granting additional legal
protection to those technological measures. "The answer to the machine
[may be] in the machine," 7°1 in that an anticopying device may forestall
rampant digital reproductions; technology might thus fix what technology breaks. But given that a third machine will likely come along to dewas an alteration of a copyrighted work and hence an infringement under familiar
principles").
66. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 102-873(l), at 18 (1992) ("The genesis of the legislation
was concern by copyright owners that the fidelity of digital reproductions of recorded
music would lead to massive unauthorized copying, significantly displacing sales.").
67. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010. Note that § 1008 bars infringement actions for
private analog copying, without a corresponding statutory remuneration.
68. Id. § 1002(a).
69. Id. § 1002(c).
70. Charles Clark, The Answer to the Machine is in the Machine, in The Future of
Copyright in a Digital Environment 139 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., Info. Law Series No. 4,
1996).
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feat the second, leaving copyright entirely up to technological fixes may
simply produce a neverending "arms race.17 1 Congress recognized that
preservation of exclusive rights in a digital environment may require not
only technological adjuncts, but also a legal ceasefire in the form of a
72
prohibition on circumvention.
Congress adopted a different approach with regard to performance
rights in sound recordings. Until 1995, owners of copyrights in sound
recordings held exclusive rights only with respect to reproduction and
distribution.7 3 In 1995, Congress extended the performance right to digital performances of sound recordings but did not accord exclusive rights
in all digital performances. Rather, the Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recordings Act distinguished interactive transmissions from transmissions more closely resembling radio broadcasts and granted exclusive
rights only in the former. The 1995 amendments to the Copyright Act
established a three-tier system. Nonsubscription digital audio transmissions were treated as analog radio transmissions had been; that is, recording artists and producers enjoyed neither control nor compensation for
public performance. Subscription digital transmissions, however, were
subject to a statutory license, provided, inter alia, that the transmitting
entity did not exceed the "sound recording performance complement,"
71. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F.
217, 251.
72. Congress applied a similar approach of mandating a technological response to
private copying in a provision of the DMCA addressed to analog videotape recording. In
Betamax, the Supreme Court had held that time shifting of free broadcast television
programming was fair use; the Court explicitly side-stepped the questions whether
retaining copies and whether taping cable or other forms of paying television were fair
uses. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55, 459 n.2
(1984). In the DMCA, Congress closed the open questions by mandating the inclusion of
copy protection technology in all new or newly repaired analog video recorders. 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(k) (Supp. V 1999). Videotape recorders will still be available, but when a user
attempts to record from encoded prerecorded tapes or transmissions, any copy the
compliant recorder makes will be substantially unviewable. Congress also made it unlawful
to circumvent the copy protection system. Id. As part of the scheme, Congress prohibited
copyright owners from encoding free broadcast television transmissions. Id. § 1201 (k) (2).
Thus, private analog videotaping of free broadcast television transmissions will remain
unrestricted-and uncompensated-but copyright owners will be able to control copying
of pay television programming and of commercially produced videocassettes that are sold
or rented.
73. The derivative works right covered only adaptations of the actual sounds, not their
imitation. Id. § 114(b) (1994). Sound recordings were long treated differently from other
copyrighted works; they were not incorporated in federal copyright subject matter until
1971. Act of October 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (superseded by Copyright
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541). In part this may reflect the White-Smith view
that a sound recording fell outside copyright because it was not a "copy." White-Smith
Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908). In part, it reflects a view, prevalent
in most civil law countries, that a sound recording qualifies only for a "neighboring right"
because it is a work of interpretation, rather than of original creation. See, e.g., A. Lucas &
H.-J. Lucas, Trait6 de la proprit6 litt~raire et artistique §§ 30, 812 (2d ed. 2001)
(discussing sound recordings and neighboring rights).
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which limited the number of songs from a particular sound recording or
by a particular artist that may be played during a three-hour period. Finally, the 1995 amendments conferred on sound recording copyright
owners full control over interactive digital transmissions as well as
over
74
subscription digital transmissions that exceeded the complement.
Why would Congress impose this split regime? Although the 1995
amendments were titled "Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
Act," the text suggests that Congress was at least as concerned with protecting sound recording copyright owners' reproductionrights as with instituting a public performance right. 75 The structure of the amendments ad-

dressed a spectrum of digital performances, from those resembling
traditional radio broadcasts, to the "celestial jukebox" model of music on
demand. While the former remained outside the sound recording copyright, the more the content of a digital transmission depended on a particular recording or artist, or could be known by the user in advance, the
more subject it became to the sound recording copyright. This is because
the more advance information the user has about the digital transmission, the more the transmission facilitates a user's private copying (in perfect digital copies) of the recorded performance, or, at least, enables the
user to substitute listening to the targeted performance for purchasing a
copy of it. Hence, Congress provided for the sound recording copyright
owner's right to prohibit interactive digital transmissions or subscription
transmissions that exceeded the "performance complement." When the
transmission was by subscription but remained within the complement,
then the sound recording copyright owner was entitled only to a statutory
license fee.
The 1995 statute supports the inferences drawn from other compulsory license schemes: When new technology develops a new mode of exploitation that does not supplant known markets for the work, and especially when copyright owners appear to be endeavoring to prevent the
dissemination of that technology, Congress will split the difference between copyright owners and other entrepreneurs or users, by providing
for compensation, but not for exclusive control over the new exploitation. On the other hand, where the new mode of exploitation threatens
to replace or substantially compete with traditional markets, and when
the new markets are ones the copyright owners seek to exploit, 76 Con-

gress will provide for exclusive rights.
74. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6),
114(d)-(j), 115(c)(3), (d) (Supp. V 1999). In 1998, Congress amended § 114 to narrow
the exemptions and to bring most noninteractive transmissions, notably webcasting, within
the scope of the compulsory license. DMCA, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 405, 112 Stat. 2860,
2890 (1998).
75. Pub. L. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336.
76. But see 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1994) (limiting the first sale doctrine to accord a
rental right to copyright owners of sound recordings and computer programs). Copyright
owners expected to invoke the right not to authorize, but to prohibit, rentals, because
there is a high correspondence between rental and uncompensated private copying. See
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COPYRIGHT AND CONTROL IN CURRENT LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW:
THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT

ACT AND NAPSTER

A. Congress Puts Control to the Fore
Seen in this light, Congress's addition in the DMCA of a new level of
copyright owners' control, through the legal protection of technological
measures, is consistent with a pattern of ensuring that exclusive rights
remain exclusive when entrepreneurs or users of new technologies propose not merely to "share" in a new market that the technologies have
opened, but to undermine the rewards drawn from the old. Moreover,
Congress did not perceive that copyright owners were trying to turn back
the clock; rather, given adequate assurance of its amenability to copyright
enforcement, copyright owners were expected to exploit the new market.
The Internet does present some differences from prior new technology cases, to the extent that the prior cases involved discrete innovations,
while the Internet is a whole system of communication, rather than a
specific device. Where past copyright owners might have sought control
over individual devices or forms of communication in order to ban them
altogether, "control" in this context does not mean shutting down the
system as a whole. But "control" can mean disabling certain features of
the system with respect to particular works, for example, by encoding the
work so as to prevent its reproduction and dissemination over the Internet. The exercise of control thus may be more precisely targeted to
permit some forms of exploitation while prohibiting others.
The nature of Internet exploitations stimulated another departure as
well: Unlike its previous forays into regulation of copyright-exploiting
technologies, Congress's focus in the DMCA was not to console copyright
owners whose claims to control new devices had already been spurned,
but to promote a new exercise of copyright, by ex ante adjusting the rules
governing the technology in aid of that objective. Congress appears to
have focused both on the new technology's impact on old markets and
on its propagation of new markets. The dual regime Congress devised
for the protection of technological measures illustrates the DMCA's
double concern.
The DMCA's dual regime protects, first, measures protecting access
to a copyrighted work, both with respect to the act of circumvention, and
with respect to the dissemination of devices designed to circumvent access controls. 77 Second, the DMCA prohibits the dissemination of devices designed to circumvent measures protecting "a right of the copyright owner,"7 8 that is, measures protecting against unauthorized
copying, adaptation, distribution, and public performance or public disS. Rep. No. 98-162, at 2 (1983) ("The Committee has no doubt that the purpose and result
of record rentals is to enable and encourage customers to tape their rented albums at
home.").
77. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (Supp. V 1999).
78. Id. § 1201(b).
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play. The latter provisions have not provoked the same ire as the provisions on circumvention of access controls, 79 in part because fair use and
other copyright defenses remain available to circumvention of "rights"
controls but most likely not to circumvention of access controls.80
"Rights" control protections may also have proved less controversial
because they seem primarily to protect the status quo in the digital environment rather than to open up new realms of copyright owning opportunities. Traditional rights under copyright did not entitle the copyright
owner to dictate the user's enjoyment of her copy; copyright owners' control over an individual copy was "exhausted" with its sale."' What I shall
call "exhaustion copies" enabled user autonomy: Purchasers could privately read, view, or listen to them as often as they liked; they could lend
them to friends or give them away; they could even engage in certain acts
of reproduction, such as the making of analog private copies of musical
recordings, 2 or of public performance or display, if these acts were
deemed fair use or otherwise permitted by the Copyright Act. By contrast, a digital work distributed with access controls may yield no exhaustion copies: The user may have purchased the physical medium through
which the work is apprehended but, because each apprehension of the
work is an act of "access," the user may not be able to acquire a standalone copy that will permit her to engage in a variety of private or excused uses without copyright owner authorization. Legal protection of
access controls thus enables copyright owners to reach individual uses.
This in turn makes it possible for copyright owners to offer, and more
importantly to enforce, different levels of enjoyment of works-for example, pay per view or per listen, keep the work for a week, view on only one
computer-at different price points. Some perceive exciting new business models that will foster the creation and distribution of a greater diversity of works to a greater range of users, particularly those unable or
79. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 415 (1999) (noting
overinclusive nature of DMCA's anticircumvention provisions); see also supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
80. On fair use and circumvention, see generally Cohen, supra note 4, at 236
(predicting that DMCA will limit flexibility of fair use doctrine); Nimmer, supra note 18
(analyzing DMCA within context of fair use doctrine). Compare RealNetworks, Inc. v.
Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *21-*24 (W.D. Wash.Jan.
18, 2000) (no fair use on the facts), with Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.
Supp. 2d 294, 322-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (fair use defense precluded by DCMA), appeal
docketed, No. 00-9815 (2d Cir. May 1, 2001). The DMCA sets out several specific
exceptions to the prohibition on circumvention of access controls; these do not include a
general fair use exemption. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)-U).
81. The "first sale" or "exhaustion" doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994), gives control
over the physical copy to its purchaser. The public performance and display rights, id.
§§ 106(4)-(5), do not extend to performances or displays originating and received at
home or another place not open to the public.
82. Id. § 1008 (also permitting noncommercial private copies using a "digital audio
recording device" or medium).
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unwilling to pay the full exhaustion copy price,8 3 while others cringe at
84
the specter of a "pay per use" world.
Do access controls simply preserve exclusive rights by updating their
exercise for the digital environment, or do they instead expand them to
an extent antithetical to the flourishing of new technologies and therefore to the "progress of science"? If, in the past, Congress tempered copyright owners' ability to control the exploitation of new dissemination
technologies (or only partly restored control after courts ruled no control
could be asserted) in order to ensure wider public availability of works of
authorship, has Congress now, in prohibiting circumvention of access
controls, favored copyright-enhancing technology at the expense of desirable copyright-eluding technologies?
83. Report of the House Committee on Commerce on the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998, H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (1998) ("In another example, an
increasing number of intellectual property works are being distributed using a 'clientserver' model, where the work is effectively 'borrowed' by the user (e.g., infrequent users
of expensive software purchase a certain number of uses, or viewers watch a movie on a
pay-per-view basis)."); Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright
Protection System for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,564 (Oct. 27,
2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) (noting that pay per use system would allow
users to buy access to the particular works that they intend to use, instead of obliging them
to invest in a larger set of works that they do not need).
A "pay-per-use" business model may be, in the words of the House Manager's
Report, "use-facilitating." The Manager's Report refers to access control
technologies that are "designed to allow access during a limited time period, such
as during a period of library borrowing" or that allow "a consumer to purchase a
copy of a single article from an electronic database, rather than having to pay
more for a subscription to a journal containing many articles the consumer does
not want." For example, if consumers are given a choice between paying $100 for
permanent access to a work or $2 for each individual occasion on which they
access the work, many will probably find it advantageous to elect the "pay-per-use"
option, which may make access to the work much more widely available than it
would be in the absence of such an option.
Id. (quoting Staff of House Committee on the Juciciary, 105th Cong., Section-By-Section
Analysis of H.R. 2281 as Passed by the United States House of Representatives on August 4,
1998, at 7 (Rep. Coble) (Comm. Print 1998)) (citations omitted); Michael A. Einhorn,
Digital Rights Management and Access Protection: An Economic Analysis 5-6, at http://
www.law.columbia.edu/conferences/2001/1l-program-en.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2001)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
84. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems
for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. at 64,573; Nimmer, supra note 18, at 710-15
(arguing that a pay per use regime is antithetical to the fair use and first sale doctrines as
well as to the idea/expression dichotomy, all traditional limitations on an author's
exclusive rights). Proponents of the exemption from liability for circumventing access
controls fear that
pay-per-use business models . . .will be used to constrain the ability of users,
subsequent to initial access, to make uses that would otherwise be permissible,
including fair uses. Without this exemption, they assert, the traditional balance
of copyright would be upset, tipping it drastically in favor of the copyright owners
and making it more difficult and/or expensive for users to engage in uses that are
permitted today.
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The answer largely depends on one's projections for the Internet
and electronic commerce in copyrighted works. If one believes that the
market for hard copies is likely to recede as works become ubiquitously
available through audio and video streaming and downloading, then digital networks will supply the principal markets for copyrighted works. This
means that control over access to digitally distributed works will become
the principal way in which exclusive rights are exercised.8 5 Congress in
the DMCA thus varied its pattern of response to new technology challenges by anticipating that online access would supplant old forms of distribution, rather than waiting to readjust the balance ex post. But the
motivation remains the same: to preserve incentives to create and disseminate when new ways of exploiting works can either enhance or
dampen those incentives, depending on who controls the new form of
dissemination. One might rejoin that when Congress anticipates rather
than reacts to a new technology problem, the copyright-using public
bears the risk of Congress's wrong guess. But the riposte is equally foreseeable: If Congress does not meet the challenge before the harm is
done, then not only copyright owners, but also the public will suffer because there will be fewer resources to support the creation of new works.
Moreover, it is not so clear that by acting early Congress substantially or
improperly changed the balance.
In an earlier era, copyright owners maintained control over access by
exercising the public performance right and by withholding copies from
the public.8 6 Today, technology has overtaken those techniques, so copyright owners respond with more technology. Arguably, the post-DMCA
allocation is out of balance, because copyright owners may, with some
exceptions, 87 protect the technological measures they employ to prevent
access and copying,"" while users are not similarly free to defeat those
measures. But users were not similarly free to access and copy works
before: Copyright law is supposed to disable unauthorized copying, at least
85. See Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies, supra note 20.
86. Before mass market recording devices, it was impossible to make copies of live or
transmitted performances, save by extraordinary feats of memory and subsequent
transmission. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32 (1882) (stage play); Nuttv. Nat'l
Inst. for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929) (public lecture).
87. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1201(k) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (discussing
incorporation of copying controls, prohibition of certain recording devices, and
technological measures). In addition, Congress provided for triennial publication of
classes of works exempt from the § 1201 (a)(]) anticircumvention provision, if the
Librarian of Congress finds that technological measures endanger the noninfringing use
of those works. 17 U.S.C. §1201 (a) (1) (C)-(D) (Supp. V 1999). On October 28, 2000, the
Librarian published its first listing. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. at 64,556-58.
88. So long as the protective device chosen qualifies as a "technological measure
[that] effectively controls access to a work," 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (3) (B) (Supp. V 1999), or
that "effectively protects a right of a copyright owner tinder this title." Id. § 1201 (b) (2) (B).
Section 1201 does not mandate manufacture of hardware compatible with a copyright
owner's choice of technological measure. Id. § 1201(c).
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so long as that copying does not qualify as a fair use. As for access, the
copyright law has neither compelled copyright owners to make a general
disclosure of their works, 8 9 nor traditionally obliged right holders to
make their works, once disclosed, available in a way that would facilitate
either access or copying, even for fair use purposes. 9°
That said, the DMCA, by enabling copyright owners to control access
to "a work," rather than simply to a "copy" of a work, arguably limits use
of a work (including fair and other noninfringing uses), even if the user
has lawfully acquired a copy of it.9 1 If the access control is "persistent,"
for example, if the technological measure requires the user to enter a
password each time the user seeks to view a work that is made available
only in access protected digital format, then every act of reading that
work implicates the copyright owner's control of access. 92 Moreover, access controls might enable the copyright owner to leverage a "thin" copyright in informational works 93 to protect public domain information.
89. On the contrary, copyright protects the right of first publication. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(3) (stating exclusive rights of owners of copyrights to distribute copies of their works
to public); Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985) ("Under
ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the first public appearance of his
undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use."). Before the 1976 Act,
common law copyright protected authors who had made only a "limited publication"
(limited disclosure). See, e.g., Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. v. CBS, 194 F.3d 1211,
1217 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding that "release to the news media for contemporary coverage
of a [televised speech] is only a limited publication").
90. For example, it is not always easy to obtain a copy of a book that has gone out of
print, but publishers, often to authors' dismay, have no duty to the public to keep a poorly
selling book in circulation, even if few libraries carry copies. Professor Sam Ricketson has
referred to this type of situation as "analog lock-up." Sam Ricketson, The Access Right 1,
Abstract to Remarks at ALAI Congress, Columbia Law School (June 14, 2001), available at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/conferences/2001/Iprogram-en.htm.
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review). But see 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k) (2) (prohibiting encoding broadcast
television programming to inhibit copying).
91. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, at 140-43 (1999); see also
Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. at 64,558 (noting that, in making this rule, the task is
to determine whether availability and use of access control measures have diminished or
will diminish ability of public to engage in lawful uses of copyrighted works that had been
available prior to enactment of DMCA).
92. See, e.g.,Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.
29, 31-32 (1994) (noting federal government's Information Infrastructure Task Force's
recommendations would "give the copyright owner the exclusive right to control reading,
viewing or listening to any work in digitized form").
93. See Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-51 (1991) (holding
that copyright in compilations of information is "thin," extending only to original
contributions, including selection or arrangement, but not to the information itself).
Regarding the concern that access controls will permit information providers to
"bootstrap" protection of public domain material, see Exemption to Prohibition on
Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 64,566 (quoting comments of Association of American Universities and others to
Copyright Office).

1636

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:1613

These outcomes would indeed deleteriously shift the balance between
owners and users.
Distasteful and dire as these projections appear, they may be conflating "access" with copying. That is, the DMCA has vested copyright owners
with control over apprehending a work in digital format, because the user
cannot "open" it for viewing or listening without complying with an access measure that she is not permitted to circumvent. Once the work is
opened, however, further acts of copying or distribution come within the
purview of technological measures protecting a right of the copyright
owner; these are subject to circumvention for fair use purposes.9 4 In addition, according to a recent study mandated by Congress and published
by the Copyright Office, control over access appears, for now, to increase,
rather than decrease, the public availability of works of authorship, because protection of technological measures removes a disincentive for
5
copyright owners to disclose otherwise vulnerable works.9
More significantly, the Copyright Office study was the first in an
ongoing inquiry into the impact of access controls on noninfringing uses
of copyrighted works. The Copyright Office study repeatedly emphasized
that, on the record of the first rulemaking, no significant showing of "digital lockup" had been made.9 6 This invites fuller showings for subsequent
rulemakings. Congress has given the Librarian of Congress authority to
declare classes of works for which access controls have compromised noninfringing uses, and to exempt those classes from application of the ban
on circumvention. Should copyright owners prove overreaching in their
implementation of access controls, and should nonprotected formats become less publicly available, the Copyright Office may well perceive a
need to list more exempted classes. 9 7 The Copyright Office's continuing
obligation under the DMCA to inquire into the impact of access controls,
and, where appropriate, to publish exempted classes every three years,
should serve as a check on copyright owner exercise of control. In other
words, the prospect of Copyright Office intervention in the implementation of technological controls may ensure that the copyright "balance" in
the digital environment between incentive to create and disclose works
on the one hand, and promotion of public instruction on the other, does
not lean too far to copyright owners at the expense of developers and
users of new technology.
B. Napster and Other Internet Related Infringement Cases
As we have seen, Congress's response to Internet exploitations has
been to anticipate potential market-displacing harm, and to encourage
94. On the distinction between "access" and fair use copying, see Exemption to
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. at 64,571-72.
95. Id. at 64,567.
96. Id. at 64,562-63.
97. Id. at 64,563.
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copyright owners to develop new modes of exploitation by vesting copyright owners with greater control over access to works. How have the
courts greeted copyright owner challenges to unauthorized reproduction
and distribution or performance of works over the Internet? Rather than
rejecting the challenges as attempts to suppress new modes of communication that did not deleteriously affect copyright owner markets, courts
have so far instead shown solicitude for copyright control over new markets generated by new technology. While most of the recent Internet related cases do not involve technological protection measures, 98 they do
confront technology-generated challenges to copyright owners' abilities
to control the channels of reproduction and distribution of their works.
For example, in Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic,99 the District Court for
the Central District of California awarded a preliminary injunction
against the unauthorized systematic copying and posting of articles from
the Los Angeles Times and other newspapers to the free-access website of
the Free Republic. Plaintiffs had their own advertising-supported and feeaccess websites for distribution of current and archived news articles. Addressing the fair use factor of harm to potential markets for the copyrighted works, 10 0 the court emphasized that plaintiffs' copyrights gave
them "the 'right to control' access to the articles, and defendants' activities affect a market plaintiffs currently seek to exploit." 10 ' Moreover,
02
were defendants' practice of full text copying to become widespread,
the market impact on plaintiffs' websites would be substantial. The court
recognized that markets created by new forms of copying remain within
the copyright owners' "right to control," even when the copyright owners'
own exploitation of those markets may not be fully developed, and even
when the defendants' encroachment, taken in isolation, may seem
modest.
Similarly, on the opposite coast, in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com,
Inc. the District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected the
fair use defense of MP3.com to its creation of a database of 80,000 CDs as
98. But see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (ordering preliminary injunction on January 20, 2000 against websites posting DeCSS software to neutralize DVD access controls); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,
111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (awarding permanent injunction on August 17, 2000),
appeal argued May 1, 2001; RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, (W.D. Wash.Jan. 18, 2000) (entering preliminary injunction against
device converting streamed audio signal from uncopiable format into signal that may be
copied).
99. 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (awarding plaintiffs summary
judgment upon finding of defendants' copyright infringement); 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1862 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (entering permanent injunction).
100. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994).
101. Los Angeles Times, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1470.
102. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)
("A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either that the
particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would adversely affect
the potential market for the copyrighted work.").
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part of a service in which MP3.com streamed back to subscribers the music that subscribers had identified to MP3.com as corresponding to CDs
that the subscribers had purchased or lawfully possessed.11 3 With respect
to the market harm fair use factor, the MP3.com court, like the Free Republic court, emphasized that "a further market that directly derives from
reproduction of the plaintiffs copyrighted works" remains within the
copyright owner's control. 114 Indeed, where Free Republic underlined defendants' incursion on new markets that the copyright owner was already
exploiting, MP3.com stressed the sound recordings copyright owners'
right to control
even if the copyright holder had not yet entered the new market
in issue, for a copyrightholder's "exclusive" rights, derived from
the Constitution and the Copyright Act, include the right,
within broad limits, to curb development of such a derivative
market by refusing to license a copyrighted work or by doing so
15
only on terms the copyright owner finds acceptable.1
Although Free Republic and MP3.com concerned control over new
markets spawned by new media, neither involved a challenge to the medium itself. The Los Angeles Times did not decry website distribution in
general; the record producers did not attack audio streaming. The cases
therefore did not cast copyright owners as enemies of new technology,
but rather as current or potential exploiters of those technologies seeking
to shoo off unpaying intruders. In that respect, these controversies resemble the radio paradigm. The most conspicuous of the Internet cases
so far, the Napster litigation,"I" while sometimes portrayed as an assault
on a new form of communication,1 0 7 in fact also is best understood as an
attempt to tame a new technology into copyright friendliness, rather than
as an endeavor to suppress it altogether.
Detailed exposition of Napster is beyond the scope of this Article; for
present purposes I intend only to examine why the Ninth Circuit determined that Napster was not the most recent in a succession of a lawfully
copyright-defying devices stretching from piano rolls through portable
MP3 players, but was instead subject to the supervision and control of
copyright owners. Napster facilitated the copying of MP3 files from one
user's hard drive to another's, by distributing peer-to-peer "Music Share"
103. 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
104. Id. at 352.
105. Id. Unlike the "Rio" controversy, see supra text accompanying notes 52-55,
copyright owner hostility to the MP3 format itself did not underlie this case; by the time
the MP3.com controversy arose, copyright owners had been licensing the audiostreaming of
works in MP3 format. See RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *7-*9 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
106. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
107. See Amended Brief Amiicus Curiae of Copyright Law Professors in Support of
Reversal at 3, Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (Nos. 00-16401, 00-16403); Amicus Curiae Brief of the
Consumer Elecs. Ass'n in Support of Reversal at 1, Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (Nos. 00-16401,
00-16403).
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software and by hosting a centralized directory that responds to searches
for particular songs by identifying the matching holdings of Napster users
currently online.108 A suit initiated by the five major record producers
charged Napster with contributory infringement; the District Court for
the Northern District of California agreed and gave Napster forty-eight
hours to purge itself of infringements or to shut down. 10 9 The Ninth
Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction;' 1 ° seven months later it affirmed the district court's ruling on the merits, but remanded for modification of the scope of the injunction."'
The remand tacitly acknowledges the concern expressed in many
amicus briefs that copyright not stifle the advance of technology. While
not all these briefs asserted the lawfulness of Napster's particular operation of peer-to-peer file sharing technology, all concurred that peer-topeer file sharing technology offers a valuable means of communication
whose dissemination should not be jeopardized by copyright enforcement. 112 Thus, the Ninth Circuit cautioned, "We are compelled to make
a clear distinction between the architecture of the Napster system and
Napster's conduct in relation to the operational capacity of the
13
system.",
In making the distinction, the Ninth Circuit was stressing that Napster
was not the Betamax case 14 all over again. While the Supreme Court had
held the videotape recorder "capable of substantial noninfringing use"
108. Despite popular characterizations of Napster as a music file "swapping" service,
the subscriber from whom the requester has obtained a copy does not in fact give up her
copy; files are not "traded," they are copied. Thus, any copy residing on a Napster
subscriber's hard drive has the capacity to turn into as many additional copies as there are
Napster subscribers.
109. See Hearing Transcript at 92, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp.
2d 896 (2000)
(No. C99-5183-MHP), available at http://www.riaa.com/PDF/
NapsterPatel.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (granting preliminary injunction,
July 26, 2000).
110. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. 00-16401, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18688,
at *1 (9th Cir. July 28, 2000) (staying preliminary injunction).
111. 239 F.3d at 1029. The district court modified and entered a preliminary
injunction on March 5, 2001. No. C99-05183-MHP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 5, 2001).
112. See Amended Brief Amicus Curiae of Copyright Law Professors in Support of
Reversal at 1, Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (Nos. 00-16401 and 00-16403) ("Napster's peer-to-peer
file sharing system is an example of an enormously promising technology that gives
individual consumers enhanced control over the information they find, save and transmit
over the Internet."); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Consumer Electronics Association in
Support of Reversal at 1, Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (Nos. 00-16401 and 00-16403) (same);
Brief of Digital Media Association as Neutral Amicus Curiae at 9, Napster, 239 F.3d 1004
(Nos. 00-16401 and 00-16403) (same); Brief ofAd Hoc Copyright Coalition et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting None of the Parties at 6, Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (Nos. 00-16401 and 0016403) (same); Brief for Amici Curiae Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc.
et al. at 2, Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (Nos. 00-16401 and 00-16403) (same).
113. 239 F.3d at 1020.
114. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984); see
supra text accompanying notes 42-51.
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because customers employed the VTR for the fair use of "time-shifting"
"free broadcast" television programs,' '5 the Ninth Circuit, like the district
court, credited the copyright owners' contention that Napster depressed
the emerging market that the owners were seeking to develop for licensed online delivery of music, and rejected all of Napster's alleged noninfringing uses. 116 For the district court, Napster's failure to demonstrate
that it was capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses and
Napster's awareness that its users were copying protected works justified
entry of the injunction." 7 The Ninth Circuit adopted an apparently
more technology-friendly approach: It stated that the district court had
"improperly confined [its analysis of noninfringing uses] to current uses,
ignoring the system's capabilities ....
Consequently, the district court
placed undue weight on the proportion of current infringing use as compared to current and future noninfringing use."'"' The Ninth Circuit
similarly warned that it would "not impute the requisite level of knowledge to Napster merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may
be used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights."' '9
These statements appear designed to alleviate concerns about conflicts between copyright and new technology: The court has clarified that
deployment of a technology that the exploiter knows can be used to infringe does not of itself satisfy the knowledge element for liability for contributory infringement. Contributory liability will not lie "merely because
the structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted
material." 120
So far so good for new copyright-implicating technologies in principle. In practice, Napster's specific implementation of the new technology
compelled condemnation, the Ninth Circuit ruled. Napster would be
held contributorily liable for its users' infringements not merely because
Napster made those infringements possible but because, unlike the manufacturer and distributors of the Betamax, "Napster [had] actual knowl115. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442-43. The Court abstracted from time-shifting of pay
television and retention copies of any kind.
116. Napster had alleged three noninfringing uses: the New Artists program, through
which performers consented to the peer-to-peer distribution of their works; "space
shifting"; and "sampling" as a prelude to purchase. The district and appellate courts
rejected the first on the grounds that Napster initiated the program only after the suit was
brought and that, in any event, the New Artist program could be separated from Napster's
principal operation of facilitating unauthorized distribution of sound recordings. The
second failed because fair use "space shifting," as understood in the Ninth Circuit, occurs
only with respect to a particular user's own holdings; it does not extend to making those
holdings available to millions of other Napster users. The last failed because the "samples"
were complete and permanent copies of the songs, rather than partial or temporary
exposures to the recordings, and because plaintiffs were already licensing online samples.
See 239 F.3d at 1018-19; 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913-17.
117. 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916-18.
118. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
119. Id. at 1020-21.
120. Id. at 1021.
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edge that specific infringing material is available using its system."'12 1 Copyright owners bear the burden of notifying Napster of infringing files
listed in its directory, but under the "notice and take down" regime endorsed by the Ninth Circuit, t 22 Napster, once alerted, incurs the responsibility to exclude those files. In effect, the technology provider's knowledge of specific user infringements overrides the impunity that the actual
or potential existence of noninfringing uses might otherwise give it.
Napster's knowledge of its users' infringing activities supplies the
crucial difference between the Napster technology and the Sony videotape recorder. Videotape recorders are a free-standing technology; as the
district court in Napsterrecognized, once a machine was sold, its producer
could no longer follow up how consumers employed it.123 As a result, the
determination of contributory infringement entailed an all or nothing
outcome: If the manufacturers were held liable, then no machine could
be distributed, despite its capacity for noninfringing uses; if they were not
held liable, then the machine could be distributed, despite its capacity for
infringing uses. Splitting the difference by limiting the function of the
machine to noninfringing uses was not a possibility because the same
act-copying-might be fair use under some circumstances, but not
under others, yet the machine could not itself determine which circumstances prevailed at any given time. As the study of the prior case law
reveals, when the choice is all or nothing, those who end up with nothing
are not likely to be the producers and consumers of a vastly popular new
device that is susceptible of legitimate applications.
With Napster, by contrast, the difference could be split; the online
technology makes it possible for copyright owners to identify the infringing content and to notify the service of its location. Once notified, the
service can remove or block access to the infringing directory listings,
thereby confining the material it helps make publicly available to noninfringing content. Once "all or nothing" is no longer the only response
1 24
the technology allows, the legal rule should show similar flexibility.
Hence, under the Ninth Circuit's approach, the new mode of communication, peer-to-peer file sharing, may continue to be employed, but because its particular implementation can be policed, 125 infringing uses
121. Id. at 1022.
122. The Ninth Circuit adopted the approach first applied in Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995), and extended it to certain online
service providers by Congress in the Online Service Provider Liability Limitation Act
provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. V 1999).
123. 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 916-17 (2000).
124. Thanks to Professor Maureen O'Rourke for stimulating these observations.
125. The Ninth Circuit also upheld the district court's finding that Napster was
vicariously liable for copyright infringement because it had the right to control its users'
acts, and derived a direct financial benefit from those acts. As a vicarious infringer,
Napster may not simply await notification by copyright owners; it has an obligation
affirmatively to "polic[e] its system within the limits of the system." Napster, 239 F.3d at
1027.
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need not be bootstrapped to lawful uses in order to maintain the availability of the desirable technological advance.
IV. OF ENFORCEMENT AND AUTHORS

A. Copyright Control, An Exercise in Futility?
But even if some new technologies, including Napster, can be policed into copyright compliance, will not other, more copyright resistant
modes of communication arise to retrieve and redistribute the excluded
content?' 26 Similarly, even if Congress's determination to afford copyright owners technologically buttressed exclusive rights is consistent with
past practice and with the constitutional scheme, does it matter in fact?
New technology in users' hands can, and for some commentators should,
strip copyright owners of any meaningful ability to enforce copyright,
whatever the Copyright Act provides.127 Self-styled "cyber anarchists" invite us to "copyright's funeral," prioclaiming that no protective measures
that copyright owners devise will withstand the efforts of hackers who will,
moreover, avail themselves of pervasive yet untraceable means of file sharing to distribute the decrypted works and/or the decryption codes. 128
If control cannot in fact be exercised, something like a compulsory
license may seem increasingly attractive. Several foreign jurisdictions, including Canada and Germany, are considering imposing a monthly
surcharge on Internet access provider service contracts and/or a levy on
digital media-including recordable CD ROMs and hard drives-that
would permit digital private copying, but would compensate music copyright owners.' 2 9 Pricing the surcharge may be problematic, however. For
126. See, e.g., Eben Moglen, Liberation Musicology, Nation, Mar. 2001, at 5-6
(arguing that other, harder to trace forms of file sharing will replace Napster).
127. See John Perry Barlow, The Next Economy of Ideas, Wired, Oct. 2000, at 240;
Moglen, supra note 126.
128. See E-mail from June M. Besek, Director of Studies, Kernochan Center for Law,
Media and the Arts, Columbia Law School, to Jane C. Ginsburg (Sept. 27, 2000, 12:38 PM)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting newsgroup conversation).
For example, despite 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (Supp. V 1999) (DMCA) and the grant of an
injunction against a website operator who posted the DeCSS code to circumvent the
encryption of DVDs, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 346
(S.D.N.Y 2000), the DeCSS code is widely available throughout the Internet, and even on
T-shirts. See, e.g., The Ultimate DeCSS Resource Site, at http://UltimateResourceSite.
com/decss/where.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(listing sites that provide copies of the code). The T-shirt is available from copyleft.net.
Copyleft, at http://www.copyleft.net/item.phtml?dynamic=I&referer=%2F&page=
product.276_front.phtml (last visited Aug. 8, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
See also M.J. Rose, How to Crack Open an E-Book, Wired News, Apr. 27, 2001 (hacker
claiming to have cracked code and removed encryption on e-books in RocketBook format,
allowing extraction of content as plain text, and to have disclosed the hack to various
Internet forums), at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,43401,00.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
129. For Canada, see Statement of Proposed Royalties to Be Collected by SOCAN for
the Public Performance or the Communication to the Public by Telecommunication, in
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example, a proposed component of the Napster-Bertelsmann settlement
would give Napster subscribers a license to copy anything from the
Bertelsmann catalogue for $4.95 a month. 130 But will it still be only $4.95
if other record producers join in? And what about other kinds of works
potentially subject to file sharing, such as text, photographic images, and
audiovisual works? What sum will seem reasonable to the consumer, yet
generate enough return to make a blanket license fee appeal to an increasingly broad class of copyright owners?13 '
Distribution of the collected sums to authors and copyright owners
may pose additional problems. Depending on how the copying occurs, it
may not always be possible to identify the copied works for which payCanada, of Musical or Dramatico-Musical Works for the Year 1999, Supp. C. Gaz. pt. I, at
26-27 (June 13, 1998) (Can.) [hereinafter Canadian Proposal for 1999] (proposing that
online music distribution sites pay minimum licensing fees of at least $0.25 per subscriber,
and limiting maximum licensing fee at 3.2% of firm's gross revenue). Known as "Tariff
No. 22," this compulsory license has been proposed by the Canadian performing rights
society, SOCAN, and published yearly in the Canada Gazette since 1996. In addition,
SODRAC, the Canadian collective that administers reproduction rights in musical
compositions, has proposed a tariff for the "Reproduction, in Canada, of Musical Works in
the Exploitation of an Electronic Network." Statement of Proposed Royalties to Be
Collected by SODRAC for the Reproduction, in Canada, of Musical Works in the
Exploitation of an Electronic Network for the Years 2001 and 2002, Supp. C. Gaz. pt. I, at 4
(May 13, 2000) (Can.) [hereinafter Canadian Proposal for 2001-02] (proposing that
network manager distributing copyrighted music pay monthly royalty "the highest of:
0.65% of its gross revenues or 100 per month per customer"). For Germany, see
Bundesregierung, Zweiter Bericht fiber die Entwicklung der urheberrechtlichen
Vergfitung gemdss §§ 54 ff. Urheberrechtsgesetz (July 5, 2000), available at http://
www.bmj.bund.de/menues/navm.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review). This
report proposing modifications to the existing levy system has been presented to the
German Parliament. So far, however, the only action taken by Parliament pertained to the
speed of photocopiers and scanners falling within the ambit of the levy system. See Gesetz
zur vergleichenden Werbung und zur Anderung wettbewerbsrechtlicher Vorschriften, v.
13.9.2000 (BGBI. I S.1375). See, for Greece, Copyright, Related Rights and Cultural
Matters, 25 Official J. State Republic Greece 25, art. 18, cl.3 (Mar. 4, 1993), available at
www.culture.gr/6/64/law2l21.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (authorizing
levies on blank recording machinery and media, including disks). See also Music on the
Internet: Is There an Upside to Downloading?: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 106th Cong. (July 11, 2000) (testimony of Jim Griffin, Founder and CEO, Cherry
Lane Digital) (offering optimistic vision of future of compulsory licenses for Internet
dissemination), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/w17112000.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
130. Matt Richtel & David D. Kirkpatrick, In a Shift, Internet Service Will Pay for
Music Rights, N.Y. Times, June 11, 2000, at Al.
131. The pricing quandary here may be more intractable than for the blanket
licensing of performance rights in nondramatic musical compositions, as neither the
nature of the work nor of the exploitation is easily circumscribed. In this context, it is
worth noting that the Canadian proposals are limited to Internet transmissions of musical
works. Canadian Proposal for 2001-02, supra note 129, at 4; Canadian Proposal for 1999,
supra note 129, at 26. On pricing of blanket licenses for public performances of musical
works, see, for example, Stanley M. Besen et al., An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Collectives, 78 Va. L. Rev. 383, 392-411 (1992) (examining pricing under a variety of
institutional circumstances).
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ment should be distributed. While direct downloads from copyright owners enable record-keeping, what if the copying occurs by means of file
sharing? Tracking these copies might be technologically possible but socially undesirable, given privacy concerns. Statistical sampling may afford
another approach but presents difficulties of its own. A system that relies
on statistical sampling for distributing monies to authors may undercompensate niche authors by undercounting low volume copying. But a system that more closely tracks actual copying may undercompensate all authors because so much of the revenue may go to cover the cost of
tracking.
Surcharges and levies may prove too gross a measure for users as
well. From the user's point of view, "all you can eat" is not necessarily the
best formula, at least not for those whose diet of copyrighted works is
modest.13 2 It also may seem antiquated to rely on such imprecise methods when digital media permit copyright owners to offer more kinds of
distributions, from pay per view to unlimited copying, and to bill and
track more cheaply and effectively than in the analog world-at least
when the customer is willing to pay, rather than to "share" copies for free.
Why would the customer be willing to pay? Assuming copyright owners dare not assume that users act by the copyright owners' sense of morality, " " ' copyright owners will have to be able to compete with "free."
How? Depending on the kind of work, copyright owners might offer auxiliary services, such as updates of informational works, or helplines for
software.' 3 4 For more free-standing kinds of works, particularly entertainment products, copyright owners might propose auxiliary goods, such as
fan club merchandise or attractive packaging. In general, if the digital
copy can be bundled with a hard copy whose disposition the copyright
owner can regulate, control may yet survive. But this depends on the
hard copy's retention of independent value as an object, such as a beautifully bound book, or as an artifact, such as an autographed CD cover.
Alternatively, copyright owners may persuade consumers to switch to a
132. Similar objections have been raised about surcharges on blank videotape: The
surcharge may compensate for private copying of motion pictures, but it disadvantages the
purchaser who acquires the tape to make home movies. Home Recording of Copyrighted
Works: Hearing on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705
Before Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 170-72 (1982) (statement of Charles D. Ferris,
Counsel, Home Recording Rights Coalition) (arguing that surcharge on VCR tapes
disadvantages consumer who purchases tapes solely for purpose of making family home
movies or for other noninfringing uses).
133. See, e.g., Laura Cometa, Napster Agreement Draws Student Criticism, Praise,
Columbia Daily Spectator, Nov. 2, 2000, at I (canvassing students' attitudes towards paying
for Napster); Darrin Bell & Theron Heir, Rudy Park: Archives (2000), at http://
www.rudypark.com/archives/rp001001.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2001) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (cartoon spoofing popular attitudes toward Napster use).
134. See, e.g., Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value, Wired (July 1995), available at http://
www.wired.com/wired/archive/3.07/dyson-pr.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing new business strategies and concerns in a world of free content).
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new format; this has happened before, when consumers, convinced of the
new format's superior convenience and durability, switched from vinyl
LPs to CDs. One may anticipate that, unlike current CDs, the next consumer-desirable format (perhaps a DVD audio that holds 100 songs) will
31 5
be access and copy-protected.'
Perhaps most likely, copyright owners might offer the consumer convenience: They can make it easier to access or copy with a license than
without one. 136 A licensed download or audio or video stream would
need to be easier to find, faster to acquire, and give a better quality copy
than a "shared" file or a hacked download. The price, if low enough, or
varied enough, would be worth the savings in transaction costs of finding
the file' 3 7 or downloading the hack and using it, particularly if the
downloading takes a long time. 13 8 Technological protections remain relevant to this system, as the transaction costs of unauthorized access and
copying are increased if the user has to circumvent the protections, and if
at least some of the circumvention activity and device market can be discouraged through section 1201.
B. The Better Beneficiaries of Copyright Control: Authors
Finally, what has all this to do with Authors? The Framers provided
that the "exclusive Right" was to be "secur[ed] ... to Authors,"'139 not
directly to publishers, producers, or other intermediate exploiters. The
control that nonauthor right holders enjoy derives from the rights the
Constitution ensures to creators. If authors do not benefit from the control they cede, then concerns about the potential incursion on public
prerogative achieved through technologically enhanced means of control
assume greater force. If authors drop out of the copyright balance, we
should more carefully watch the weight of the right holders.
But do authors have to drop out? Employee authors and others subject to the "works made for hire" rule 140 are cast out of copyright, as the
statute deems their employers and hiring parties the "author." Moreover,
135. It is also possible that some users, like supporters of public radio and public
television, will be willing to pay a subscription fee or even per use, because they perceive a
need to support the dissemination of quality content that would not otherwise be available
in a purely market or advertising based model.
136. Cf. Neil Strauss, Foraging for Music in the Digital Jungle, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20,
2001, at El (comparing user friendly but unauthorized services like Napster with
cumbersome, copyright owner approved streaming sites).
137. Particularly if centralized file sharing services, such as Napster or Scour, are no
longer available, and the user must resort to services such as Gnutella or Freenet, which are
more complicated to use because they are more dispersed.
138. The importance of the last consideration may recede as more users acquire
faster data connections and as compression formats advance, particularly for audiovisual
works. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 314-15,
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing amount of time required to download motion pictures from
De-CSS-hacked DVDs).
139. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.8 (emphasis added).
140. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (1994).
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in many sectors, creators who retain authorship status nonetheless assign
all rights for a small royalty, or even a flat one-time payment.' 4 ' Perhaps,
then,just as eighteenth-century publishers advanced their claims through
appeals to the moral justice of remunerating authors whom they
promptly despoiled, 142 today's copyright rhetoric of control is merely a
3
pretext for corporate greed.14
Indeed, one might suppose that authors would be better off with a
compulsory license regime than an "exclusive right," at least if a statute
guaranteed creators a fixed and generous percentage of the sums collected under the license.'44 But the conclusion that a compulsory license
regime is better for authors than exclusive rights presumes that authors
are obliged in practice to give up their rights to a publisher; it disregards
the potential of digital media to free authors from the corporate distributors on whom they depended to bring their work to the public. Traditionally, publishers have performed or overseen the following functions:
selection; editing; reproducing the work in copies for distribution; distributing; marketing, including advertising and promotion; and accounting to the author for royalties. Today, some of these functions are no
longer required, and others can be disaggregated; we can foresee that
authors may undertake many of these tasks themselves, or subcontract
them without giving up their copyrights. Similarly, freelance authors who
can self-distribute may more effectively resist hiring parties' attempts to
contract into work for hire status. The more self-publication offers realis-

141. See Michele Ressi &John M. Kernochan, The Author's Trade: How Do Authors
Make a Living? 69, 197 (1993). Not surprisingly, author organizations oppose assigning all
rights. On its website, the American Society for Journalists and Authors "reiterates its
opposition to [works made for hire] or all-rights contracts." ASJA Public Section, at http://
www.asja.org/new/pubtips/wmfl01.php (last visited Aug. 8, 2001) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). Similarly, the Authors Guild advises "never transfer or assign the
copyright." Contract Advice, at http://www.authorsguild.org/contractadvice.html (last
visited Aug. 8, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
142. See, for example, the 1777 petition of the advocate Cochu on behalf of the Paris
publishers, reprinted in La proprieti littraire au XVIIIe silcle (1859), at 159-98
(pleading the fundamental nature of intellectual property rights). For a brief history of
early copyright development, see generally John Feather, Authors, Publishers and
Politicians: The History of Copyright and the Book Trade, 10 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 377
(1988).
143. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, Counter Culture: Dot-communist Manifesto, N.Y.
Times Magazine, June 1], 2000, at 30 (asserting that Napster is successful manifestation of
communist ideals). For a musician's perspective, see Lars Ulrich, It's My Property,
Newsweek, Jun. 5, 2000, at 54; cf. Neil W. Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our
System of Free Expression, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1879, 1889 (2000) (contending that eventually
"those seeking to reach a mass audience [via the internet] will need to do so through
conglomerate-controlled outlets").
144. Supra note 131; see also Calandrillo, supra note 7, at 338-39 (advocating a
"publicly funded reward system" as an alternative means of compensating authors for the
creation of socially beneficial informational works).
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tic prospects of remuneration for authors, 45 the more likely we are to see
an increase in the volume and diversity of works of authorship, as authors
will be able to bypass the gatekeeping functions of publishers and other
intermediaries. This may not always bode well for quality, but it is not
evident that today's intermediaries invariably select on the basis of literary
146
or artistic achievement, or even know it when they see it.
Justice
Holmes once declared, "the taste of any public is not to be treated with
contempt,"1 47 but he said it at a time when intermediaries still dictated
the taste of the public by determining the works to which the public
would be offered access. Now, the prospects for authors to reach "any"
public, including highly discrete or specialized segments of the public,
seem well within reach. As a result, it would be premature to surrender
the control the copyright law vests in authors, at least if that surrender
despairs of authors' abilities effectively to manage their own copyrights in
48
a digital environment.
145. We are not there yet, as Stephen King's attempts to market his work directly over
the Internet have demonstrated. The endeavors yielded substantial readership, much of it
non-paying, however. See, e.g., USA Today, King Returns to Roots as He Branches Out
(November 7, 2000), available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/enter/books/
book874.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing declining rate of payment
for downloads of self-published serial novel The Plant); Web Spinner: Stephen King's New
Tale Hits the Internet, July 24, 2000, at http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/tech/
DailyNews/kingOO0724.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing serial
publication of "the Plant" without intermediaries and how Stephen King forecasts vibrant
future for self-publishing authors on the Internet, despite disappointing experience of
publisher-issued electronic distribution of earlier e-book, "Ride the Bullet").
146. Despite perceptions of a recent rise in publisher philistinism, see, e.g., Doreen
Carvajal, Middling (and Unloved) in Publishing Land, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1997, at D1
(discussing publishers terminating midlist authors in favor of talk show best sellers), the
problem is hardly new, or for that matter, confined to the U.S. For example, Proust was
unable to obtain a publishing contract for the first volumes of A la recherche du temps perdu,
and ended up paying a publisher a substantial sum to print and distribute it. See generally,
Andr6 Francon, Proust et la publication A compte d'auteur, in Jean Claude Soyer:
L'honnete homme et le droit 227 (2001) (recounting Proust's publishing travails). Had it
not been for Proust's considerable family wealth, his novel might never have reached the
public. Id. at 234.
147. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing, 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903).
148. Arguably, the restoration of control to authors, rather than, or on occasion in
addition to, industrial strength copyright owners, should also counter the fear that
exclusive rights under copyright will end up monopolizing not only the rights of
distribution of works of authorship, but the means as well. Cf. H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at
6-8 (debating exclusive rights and fear of monopoly in mechanical recording equipment).
If authors band together to license their rights collectively, however, monopoly concerns
return, as the antitrust history of ASCAP and BMI illustrates.

